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NON-TECHNICAL SUMMARY  
The nature of social policy is the abatement of individual risks. When individuals are laid off from work, when they 
fall sick or even become disabled due to an accident or when they simply become old and thus, unable to sustain 
their own living with wage employment, social policies such as unemployment and disability insurance, health 
insurance and pensions step in and provide support. It is usually the state which manages welfare programs and 
provides in times of need. The state is most suitable to handle this task since considering the tremendous costs 
involved in generous social programs that follow a universal character, supporting individuals independent from 
prior contributions to the system, welfare state policies are usually financed through tax revenue. In high-income 
countries such as Sweden or Denmark, we take it for granted that public institutions and the responsible political 
actors are capable to handle this task. The questions that arise in these contexts ask how much to provide and who 
should benefit. However, when we turn our focus to welfare state policies in less developed democracies such 
questions only become relevant at the second stage. The first question to ask should be: are individuals equally 
confident in “their” state as reliable manager of social policies so that they turn toward this entity for social 
protection? This study sets out to examine how the capacity of the state to extract revenue to finance the welfare 
state and its distributive capacities, that are needed to deliver social services, influence individual preferences for 
state-led welfare provision and income redistribution in low- and middle-income democracies compared to 
advanced industrial states.  
Conventional political economy theories explain support for welfare policies with the individual’s income situation. 
The lower the individual’s income the higher is the demand. Starting from here I argue that the prerequisite of well-
functioning institutions and a well-organized economy for these classical theories on social policy preferences is not 
met in the developing-country context. Here, the opposite is the case: the institutional framework is fragile and 
inefficient, means of tax collection fall below expectations, and a high informal economy repulse the idea that social 
policy preferences work according to the classical formula attained from studies of high-income democracies. In 
such a context, it is not unlikely that even low-income earners, who are usually beneficiaries of welfare state 
policies, show lower demand for state-led welfare provision, because they fear that tax money will only dissipate in 
opaque loopholes of corruption. I argue that the reliability that the state is capable to provide services as response 
for paid contributions is in doubt when the capacities of the state are weak. As consequence, only with increasing 
capacities of the state to fulfil the task of welfare provision will individuals turn towards the state to handle 
redistribution and the provision of benefits in times of need. 
The empirical analysis is based on statistical analysis of public opinion data from the World Values Survey and 
confirms expectations; the better the distributive and extractive capacities of the state the more supportive 
individuals are for the state to provide welfare services and to reduce income differences through means of 
redistribution. Moreover, the impact of state capacity is stronger for low- and middle-income democracies 
compared to high-income countries, which supports the hypothesis posed in this analysis. The contribution of this 
study is twofold: the analysis draws the attention to the importance to study social policy preferences from an 
institutional perspective, to link individual- and country-level factors to a more encompassing theory of social 
policy preference formation. Furthermore, it stresses the importance to adjust theories that are elaborated within a 
high-income country context by factoring in developing country characteristics, to be able to explain individual 
preferences for public policies. 
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Abstract 
Neither well-functioning institutions nor a well-organized economy can be taken for granted 
when studying social policy preferences in the Global South. On the contrary, in many low 
and middle-income countries fiscal capacity is low, the informal sector is considerable, and 
the quality of institutions lacks far behind, so that reliable provision of public welfare goods is 
at question. The paper argues that a weak state discourages expectations of the public welfare 
system so that welfare demand rises only with growing institutional performance and 
compelling fiscal capacity. Using multilevel analysis of public opinion data for both low and 
middle-income democracies and advanced industrial states, the article shows that the level of 
fiscal capacity and the quality of institutions is particularly relevant for individual welfare 
demand and preferences for redistribution in low- and middle-income democracies. Well-
performing distributive and extractive capacities of the state raise social policy preferences. In 
contrast, institutional dysfunctionalities such as a rising informal sector and corruption exert a 
detrimental effect. The results reveal the need for explicit analysis of the characteristics of 
developing countries in order to understand social policy preferences in less affluent 
democracies. 
 
Keywords: social policy preferences; institutions; fiscal capacity; developing countries 
1 Introduction
Research on social policy preferences has come a long way in the last decade, providing insightful
theories and evidence on the determining factors of welfare and redistributive preferences1.
However, studies that take into account particularities of low- and middle-income democracies
are hard to find. Which factors drive welfare preferences when the stable background of high-
income states dissolves?
A functioning state is in many cases a preliminary assumption of welfare research, which
goes without mention. However, social policy is not only a central issue for affluent countries
but also for the steadily evolving welfare systems in low and middle-income states (see Haggard
and Kaufman, 2008). Theories on social policy preferences have to encompass characteristics of
the developing world in order to explain welfare preferences in less affluent countries. Neither
a well-functioning state nor a well-organized economy can be taken for granted. These factors
critically undermine seminal theories on welfare preferences. A rather fragile democratic system
might affect citizens’ demand for publicly provided welfare by putting reliable redistribution of
benefits at risk. As Rothstein et al. poignantly emphasize: “we need an explanation for why
people trust the state to handle risk protection and/or redistribution”2 (2011, 4). I argue in this
article that the explanatory factor is the quality of institutions and the capacity of the state to
provide and distribute social services.
Classical political economy theories advocate that individuals are driven by economic self-
interest in their welfare demand (see Corneo and Grüner, 2002). However, empirical evidence
of Dion and Birchfield (2010) dismisses the motive of monetary self-interest as sole driver when
it comes to redistributive ideals, particularly for the low- and middle-income country context.
Only in interaction with economic development and lower rates of income inequality does self-
interest drive redistributive preferences. Hence, the developmental stage influences social policy
preferences in the Global South. The recent contribution of Huber and Stephens (2012) promi-
nently advocates for the importance of a democratic context for welfare state development,
1See Meltzer and Richard (1981); Piketty (1995); Svallfors (1997); Benabou and Ok (2001); Iversen and Soskice
(2001); Moene and Wallerstein (2001); Corneo and Grüner (2002); Blekesaune and Quadagno (2003); Linos and
West (2003); Mares (2005); Alesina and La Ferrara (2005); Scheve and Stasavage (2006); Cusack et al. (2006);
Larsen (2008); Bartels (2010); Finseraas (2009); Rehm (2009); Dion and Birchfield (2010); Gingrich and Ansell
(2012); Rehm et al. (2012); Busemeyer et al. (2009); Busemeyer (2012).
2Original emphasis.
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focusing on Latin America. Drawing upon (Mares, 2005), who shows that state capacity influ-
ences a state’s level of social insurance, this article postulates that individual preferences for
state-led welfare provision and redistribution are positively affected by the state’s fiscal capaci-
ties and the institutional performance. I define fiscal capacity as a function of the enforcement
of tax liability (cf. Besley and Persson, 2010). If the state performs well in collecting taxes,
and if a functional institutional framework is in place, individuals favor governmental social
protection as opposed to personal savings and individual care, as a more capable state is more
likely to be a reliable provider of benefits. This demand might be diluted in the presence of a
large informal sector, which increases the proportion of individuals who are able to free-ride on
governmental resources that are provided as public goods and who reduce the public budget by
withholding taxation. Also corruption should work negatively on social policy preferences in the
developing world, as it contrasts fiscal capacity and the quality of institutions and exacerbates
the collective action problem of public goods provision (see Scholz and Lubell, 1998; Rothstein
et al., 2011).
Using pooled World Values Survey data from several time periods (wave IV-V)3 on low-,
middle- and high-income democracies, I investigate in a multilevel framework how the contextual
factors of fiscal capacity and the quality of institutions influence preferences for state-led wel-
fare provision and redistribution in different developmental stages, also involving high-income
democracies. Applying hierarchical modeling techniques, I show that fiscal capacity and the
quality of institutions indeed affect social policy preferences. As expected, the varying intercept
model reveals that fiscal capacity only matters for low- and middle-income democracies; it does
not influence individual preferences in high-income societies of the global North. The quality
of institutions, however, has a positive impact on redistributive preferences in both developed
and developing countries. Redistributive preferences, which also attribute to the notion social
justice, seem to be most sensitive to the institutional context.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the relevant literature on social
policy preferences and the findings of the political economy literature on developing countries.
In section 3 I elaborate the theoretical framework before I introduce method, data and the
3The World Values Survey (2009) conducts surveys at irregular intervals (waves) with survey periods over
several years. Wave IV (1999-2004) and wave V (2005-2008) are used in this study. The study of Dion and
Birchfield (2010), which also studies developing countries among others, employs a much larger dataset by
pooling an extensive number of surveys and survey years. I reject this approach as the wording of survey items
differs across surveys which makes such a pooling strategy a questionable matter.
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estimation model in section 4. Section 5 displays the results of the analysis, followed by further
robustness checks in section 6. The paper concludes with a discussion of the findings in the
light of current and future research.
2 Social Policy Preferences and the Welfare State
The emerging literature on the welfare state in less affluent democracies agrees that theories and
concepts of the classical welfare state literature struggle to travel well towards the Global South.
The logic of ‘compensation hypothesis’ (Katzenstein, 1985) does not work in the developing
world, where economic vulnerability constraints the ability of states to cushion shocks from
the international market (see Wibbels, 2006). Approaching the research field from a macro
perspective, Segura-Ubiergo and Kaufman (2001) and Wibbels (2006) show that, particularly
in Latin America, welfare expenditures are highly sensitive to trends in the global economy. In
contrast to this, scholars argue that while globalization puts welfare systems under stress, years
of democratic experience exert a positive impact on welfare expenditures (Brown and Hunter,
1999; Rudra, 2004; Avelino et al., 2005; Rudra and Haggard, 2005; Huber et al., 2008; Huber
and Stephens, 2012).
While we learn from this literature that welfare budgets in developing countries are highly
sensitive to the global economy and democratization, we need to be careful not to overestimate
findings that are derived from a highly aggregated analysis. Macro-level analyses in many
instances lack a micro-level theory which substantiates the macro-level relation (see Kittel,
2006). They miss the actor through which social policy is channeled, as Cramer and Kaufman
(2011) also observe. The analysis below aims at this research gap, linking macro-level factors to a
micro-level theory of social policy preferences, following Mares and Carnes (2009) who advocate
a more sensitive analysis of micro-level mechanisms in welfare state research on developing
countries.
The study benefits from the rich body of literature on social policy and redistributive pref-
erences that have been mostly addressed by empirical studies of Western democracies. Building
on the classical work of Meltzer and Richard (1981) and the median voter theory, scholars have
shown that redistributive preferences are a consequence of individual’s income status (Finseraas,
2009) and insurance needs (Moene and Wallerstein, 2001), level of education and specificity of
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skills (Cusack et al., 2006), social mobility expectations (Piketty, 1995; Benabou and Ok, 2001),
uncertainty and the need to insure income loss when employed in a vulnerable economic sector
(Mares, 2005), or ethnic and religious heterogeneity (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005; Scheve and
Stasavage, 2006). This paper shares with the literature the idea that individual-level factors
explain much of the variance in social policy preferences. However, context characteristics of
low-and middle-income democracies have so far been ignored in this branch of literature. Re-
search on public policy preferences in low- and middle-income states, is just at the starting
point. A first study in this research field by Cramer and Kaufman (2011) on attitudes toward
fairness of wealth distribution in Latin America supports the need for greater attention to social
policy preferences in low- and middle-income countries4. The authors show that attitudes to
distributive justice are influenced by the context people live in. Following these findings and
adopting an institutionalist approach, this study emphasizes that context affects attitudes. This
process is however not just one-sided. The “policy feedback” literature prominently emphasizes
that public policies affect attitudes (see Svallfors, 1997) which again feed back into the system
via the responsiveness of political parties to public demand (see Kenworthy and McCall, 2008;
Brooks and Manza, 2006, 2007). Endogeneity between welfare demand and the welfare system
is a likely case. Political responsiveness is however slightly less given in low- and middle-income
democracies, so that the danger of an endogeneity bias is lower in this context. Additionally, in-
stitutions change and prosper rather incrementally and thus, by studying a narrow time period
I decrease the hazard of an endogeneity bias.
3 Theoretical Framework
3.1 Social Policy Preferences and Context
The welfare system contains a redistributive and an insurance character (Moene and Waller-
stein, 2001). Ideally, it redistributes income from rich to poor and protects individuals from
income loss in old age, unemployment, disability and sickness5. Welfare demand and redistribu-
tive preferences thus allude to different dimensions of the welfare state. The former referring
to provision of benefits and insurance while the latter also attributes to an equality principle.
4See also Gaviria (2007) for a study on redistributive preferences in Latin America and Dion and Birchfield
(2010) who examine redistributive preferences in a large N setting with a development economics focus.
5Unfortunately, the WVS survey data does not allow to empirically distinguish between redistributive and
insurance preferences.
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Structural weaknesses in institutional capacity to provide welfare as it has been decided polit-
ically could severely restrict individual demand for state-led welfare provision and preferences
on redistribution, due to a lack of reward for paid contributions.
Inspired by the work of Mares (2005) on social protection in high- and low-risk sectors,
which finds state capacity and external insecurity have a strong effect on the level of social
insurance, I argue that fiscal capacity and institutional quality enter people’s utility function
regarding welfare preferences. Mares brings to the forefront the idea that “in the presence of an
‘inefficient’ state, the high-risk sector might find state-administered social policies unattractive”
(2005, 644). Efficiency of the state is defined as the state’s ability to collect and to legally enforce
social insurance contributions (Mares 2005)6. In order to capture the performance of the state I
look at the state’s fiscal capacity and institutional quality. Fiscal capacity focuses on extractive
capacity whereas the concept of institutional quality adheres to the distributive capacity of the
state. While Mares (2005) conducts the empirical analysis on the macro level, examining the
extent of social insurance provided by the state in a cross-country analysis – that is, looking
at the welfare output – I approach the argument at the micro level, examining the input side
of the welfare state. Drawing upon Rothstein et al. (2011, 8), the welfare state represents
a “mega-sized collective action problem”, as individuals only contribute to the welfare system
when they are confident that others do the same. From a rational choice perspective, individuals
do not only consider their own action but also take into account other people’s behavior, which
makes them strategic actors. Free-riding of informal sector workers poses a danger to this “trust
game” (Rothstein et al., 2011, 9). In countries where the shadow economy amounts to more
than 40 per cent of GDP, such as Georgia, Guatemala, or Peru (Schneider et al. 2010), it is
questionable that public policy preferences remain unaffected by the domestic structure of the
labor market and obvious dysfunctionalities of public institutions, where a large group is able
to benefit without contributing.
I pose the hypothesis that a weak state7 discourages demand for publicly provided welfare
6In contrast to Mares (2005), I focus on fiscal capacity, operationalized by overall tax revenue and institutional
performance instead of applying the concept of state capacity, measured by social insurance contributions. For
reliable welfare provision, it needs more than just extractive capacity. Capacity to deliver social services need to
be in place as well according to theoretical considerations applied here.
7The notion of ‘weak’ is not meant to define a dichotomous category of weak and strong states, as the very
intention of the analysis is to show that there is variation among so called weak states in terms of institutional
and structural strength. Hence, the idiom is only used to distinguish between advanced industrial states and less
developed democracies before moving to a closer analysis of variation within this latter group.
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in two ways: first, as an ineffective state lacks the means to collect state revenue in terms of
taxation, and, second, as such a state lags behind in distributing social benefits. Despite a
need for financial support, individuals might then reject the state as the instrument of provision
(given that provision is based on redistribution) when these two elements are ineffective. I define
fiscal capacity as a state’s strength in collecting tax: the extractive capacity of the state. State
revenue is fundamental for a state to work, as institutional and social infrastructure needs to be
financed collectively, and this is done by means of taxation. Efficient tax collection reflects, on
the one hand, the structural enforcement power of the state (Lieberman, 2002) and, on the other
hand, the amount of tax revenue available to finance social policies. Transfer policies and fiscal
policies are hence two sides of the same coin. Increased taxation also means that individual’s
expectations of the state to provide rise. I focus on general tax revenue, which does not include
social security contributions, as social security contributions are directly linked to social policy
preferences by a mechanism of payment-and-reward8. Instead, fiscal capacity attributes to the
states general strength of raising revenue. The capacity to collect taxes is therefore the first
pillar on which the notion of a functional and capable state rests (cf. Besley and Persson, 2010).
H 1 If fiscal capacity increases, it increases the individual’s demand for
governmental engagement on welfare provision and preferences for
redistribution in low- and middle-income democracies.
The second pillar is categorized as institutional performance. Distributive capacities of the
state are not less of importance, which are represented by the quality of institutions. Institu-
tional performance in terms of lack of corruption, a functioning bureaucracy, balance of power,
and the stability of the political system are likely to enter the individual’s utility function when
formulating social policy preferences. Rothstein et al. (2011) illustrate for the OECD context
that in order for the working class to mobilize and push for a welfare system (which explains the
development of the welfare state in the power-resource theory, see Huber and Stephens (2001)),
well-functioning institutions need to be in place at first. The concept which they employ focuses
on the “quality of the government” and not just on the quality of institutions as performed here.
Their concept is more encompassing and poses higher data constraints, especially for low- and
8Moreover, informal workers (who are also covered by the survey used in the analysis below) do not pay social
security contributions, and would, thus, not be affected by fiscal capacity when the concept is operationalized
with social security contributions.
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middle income democracies, which is why I choose a more narrow concept that relies on the
quality of institutions9. The authors analyze the relationship between the quality of the gov-
ernment and social spending at the macro level, finding empirical evidence for a positive effect
of governmental quality on welfare output. As Rothstein (2011) shows in a latter contribution
with a field experiment, the quality of the government relates to individual perception of the
state and general trust in society, which are factors needed, according to the author, to escape
from the “low trust – high inequality – high corruption” equilibrium (2011, 154). A better
government in terms of effective institutions is more likely to increase the country’s economic
performance (cf. Keefer and Knack, 1997; La Porta et al., 1999), which also opens up the chance
for a more generous welfare system.
The proposed mechanism works through the individual’s experiences with ‘the state’. The
state is of course not a unitary actor, but a much more vague entity to which individuals hold
a general attitude as informational shortcut. Individuals assess the capacity of the state to
generate revenue and to deliver welfare services through various experiences with the state in
their everyday life, which occurs through many different channels. Meeting informal street-
vendors on the street, making the experience to be asked for a bribe when applying for a service
in the public administration or reading in the newspaper about fraud in the electoral process,
induce the perception of a less reliable state. The cognitive process leads to an adjustment
of incentives regarding welfare provision and redistribution for the individual. A state that is
not capable to deliver services in return for paid contributions decreases the incentive for the
individual to pay tax in order to finance public transfers and to ask for increased redistribution
(which means a further tax increase, depending on income group). Thus, demand for welfare
provision through the state should be lower when the state lacks reliability.
The question still is – which type of institutions are needed to make welfare provision reli-
able? Rodrik (2000) looks at this question from an economic development enhancing principle.
Institutions needed for a market to function are: “property rights; regulatory institutions; in-
stitutions for macroeconomic stabilization; institutions for social insurance; and institutions of
conflict management” (Rodrik, 2000, 5). Rothstein (2011, 13), on the other hand, boils it down
9The authors construct a data set for the quality of the government based on expert surveys which does however
not include enough low- and middle income democracies for the time period studied here to be applicable for
this analysis. For a discussion on the utility of the Worldwide Governance Indicators (2012b, WGI) that is used
to operationalize institutional performance see Holmberg et al. (2009).
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to a procedural definition, classifying the quality of the government by its degree of impartial-
ity. I argue that the quality of institutions relates to both elements. A procedural definition is
needed, which is not based on the outcome. But at the same time, certain institutions need to
be in place for a market mechanism to work, as welfare provision is bound to the prerequisites
of an iterated public goods game. Kaufmann et al. (2010) provide a comprehensive dataset
with the prominent Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) that encompass these elements.
They incorporate information on “rule of law”, “voice and accountability”, “political stability”,
“government effectiveness”, “regulatory quality”, and “control of corruption”. A well-established
legal system counteracts state capture by corrupt and rent-seeking officials, enforcing adherence
to the rules of the game. Thus, the more entrenched the rule of law and regulatory quality,
the less able are greedy elites to extract benefits from the state and individuals to evade tax,
increasing accountability and reliability of state performance (Keefer and Knack, 1997). All of
these indicators capture a latent element which I define as institutional quality. Individuals do
not form their attitude on the capacity of state just based on one particular experience with the
state but based on a variety of experiences with public officials and public authorities, media
coverage, and observations of functionalities and dysfunctionalities in people’s everyday life.
The sum of such experiences creates the perception of the state’s distributive capacity in the
mind of the individual. Under conditions of pervasive institutional weakness, ordinary citizens
turn less toward the state to manage welfare provision and to handle the task of redistribution.
Or, in turn:
H 2 If the quality of institutions increases, it increases the individuals’
demand for governmental engagement on welfare provision and
preferences for redistribution in low- and middle-income democracies.
Fiscal capacity and the quality of institutions as defined here are with not doubt interlinked.
I consider both constructs as congruent factors. Fiscal capacity is also dependent on a well-
functioning institutional framework. The proposed mechanism should mainly occur in states
where fiscal capacity and institutional quality are still developing. It is unlikely that institutional
quality heavily influences welfare demand in advanced industrial countries such as in Sweden or
Denmark, where the institutional status quo is constantly at a very high level10. In high income
10Countries such as Italy or Greece might be outliers.
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democracies, reliable distribution of services, means of the state to levy tax or the danger of
corruption are much less of an issue. It is even more likely to observe a reversed effect, meaning
that high institutional quality and a very capable state decrease welfare demand because of a
saturation effect11. As Linos and West (2003) emphasize, and also Dion and Birchfield (2010)
support this argument, there is cross national variation in the determining factors of social
policy preferences. Some factors are more relevant for social policy preferences in some regions
and not in others, as will be explored below.
3.2 The Dysfunctional Equivalent: The Size of the Informal Sector and Corruption
The building blocks of the social safety net are tax payers and an effective state that manages
welfare accounts and distributes benefits according to the rules of the game. Loayza and Rigolini
(2011) underline the argument that the rule of law is inversely related to the informal sector, so
that the informal sector is likely to rise with lower institutional performance and lacking fiscal
strength, even though the relationship is more complex12. The size of the informal sector is
negatively correlated to fiscal capacity and the quality of institutions but these factors are far
from perfectly predicting each other. The size of the informal economy influences the amount
of public revenue available for redistribution, rendering public engagement in welfare a very
costly product (Hatipoglu and Ozbek, 2011). The larger the informal sector, the smaller the
public budget which is based on tax revenue. Moreover, informal workers are able to free-ride
on public welfare goods, extracting benefits without contributing. Informal-sector employment
accordingly also depletes the pool of public welfare goods so that this fact is likely to influence
individual preference of those who are not employed in the shadow economy in a negative sense.
Next to the size of the informal sector, low- and middle-income countries encounter the
sticky phenomena of corruption and clientelism. Negative effects of corruption and clientelistic
structures on economic development and the political system have been a strong focus of aca-
demic attention in the last decades. Seligson (2002) finds in a study on Latin American countries
11A similar effect can be observed for social spending, GDP per capita or growth of GDP, which sometimes
exert a negative effect on welfare demand (see Dion and Birchfield, 2010).
12Tax avoidance is a major though not the only reason for individuals to engage in the informal economy,
as Portes and Sassen-Koob (1987) demonstrate. Perry et al. (2007) argue that informality encompasses huge
heterogeneity among actors and their motives for entering the informal sector. Among these reasons are deliberate
exclusion from benefits by ruling elites in certain sectors (state capture), costs of entry in terms of registration
and bureaucracy (cf. Djankov et al., 2002) and labor market regulations. It is too simplistic, therefore, to define
the informal sector as a direct consequence of low fiscal capacity and lacking institutional performance even
though these factors are with no doubt interlinked.
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that corruption decreases trust in the legitimacy of the political system and also interpersonal
trust. Trust is an essential factor for the public goods game, because it is based on iteration.
It is a common insight that welfare provision encounters collective action problems. As Scholz
and Lubell point out “citizens undertake some immediate costly effort like paying taxes, and
face some risk that future collective benefits expected in return for compliance [...] may not
materialize unless the government and other citizens maintain their side of the bargain” (1998,
400). If this trust is undermined by illegitimate behavior in terms of free-riding of informal
sector workers or corrupt and clientelistic behavior of government officials, a downward spiral
of noncompliance is the likely outcome of this public goods game. Therefore, the analysis below
additionally tests the potential detrimental effect following from a large informal economy and
corruption on social policy preferences.
4 Empirical Strategy
As the theoretical framework explicitly models country-level variables, I will apply a multilevel
model instead of using fixed effects. With multilevel analysis it is possible to model the varia-
tion between groups, which is in this case the variation of certain macro-level factors between
countries (Gelman and Hill, 2007; Steenbergen and Jones, 2002). Individuals are assumed to
be nested in countries, which affects their social policy preferences; thus, a multilevel model
accounts for the hierarchical nature of the model structure. The World Values Survey (WVS)
serves as database. I pool survey waves IV and V, as they capture a large set of developing
countries13. Multilevel modeling technique allows to pool the data despite varying group sizes.
Data for the macro variables will be explained in the course of the following sections.
4.1 Dependent Variables: Welfare Demand and Redistribution
I derive the dependent variable welfare demand from the following WVS item (e037): “[t]he
government should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for” vs “[p]eople
should take more responsibility to provide for themselves”, recoded on a scale from 10 (the for-
13Wave IV ran between 1999 and 2004 and wave V was collected from 2005 to 2008. I use a dummy variable
to control for survey period. Countries drop out of the data set due to missing items in a number of surveys.
Additionally, countries are excluded because of missing macro-level data.
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mer) to 1 (the latter)14. The dependent variable is conceptualized as preference in favor of
state-led welfare provision: in short, welfare demand. The meaning of the phrase is consid-
ered as sufficiently indicating “demand” for welfare expenditures by the notions of “government”,
“responsibility”, and “provide”. However, it should be recognized that the item omits to remind
the respondent that increased welfare engagement by the state involves not only gains but also
losses in terms of increased taxation15. The second dependent variable, redistribution is
based on the survey item e035 asking the respondent on a scale from 1 if “[w]e need larger
income differences as incentives for individual effort” to 10 if “[i]ncomes should be made more
equal”. Higher values reflect a preference in favor of redistribution.
The analysis rests on a linear hierarchical varying intercept model16. The dependent vari-
able is treated as a continuous variable, ignoring the scaling boundaries of 1 and 10 of the
measurement. This is a common approach, taking into account the complexity of a random
intercept hierarchical model, and statistically unproblematic (cf. Gelman and Hill 2007, 123).
In the robustness section, I also estimate the model as logistic hierarchical model in order to
test if respondents cluster at certain extreme points of the 1 to 10 scale.
4.2 Independent Variables
Fiscal capacity and the Quality of Institutions
I operationalize fiscal capacity with tax revenue data (cf. Besley and Persson, 2010) to measure
the extractive capacity of the state. I use World Bank (WDI, 2012a) data on tax revenue
14The DV item is based on the “bipolar approach” used in survey design methodology (Groves et al. 2009, 249).
The respondent has to choose between two alternatives, government responsibility versus individual responsibility,
which reduces the measurement error that results from acquiescence. However, individual responsibility is not
the opposite of government responsibility, so that the item might be biased by the respondent’s preference for ‘big
government’ versus lean states (in a neoliberal sense). In order to reduce this bias I control for the respondent’s
political ideology.
15The item refers to the status quo of welfare provision, which could be considered as an obstacle to compare
welfare demand– as conceptualized here –, across countries. Ideally, one would use an item which is more abstract
and not referring to the status quo. However, such an item does not exist in the WVS, which is a necessary
data source due to the substantial interest in social policy preferences in low- and middle-income democracies
– a topic with high data scarcity. Furthermore, even though the comparability of the item is a valid concern, I
confine the argument to some degree with a technical fix by using social spending data to control for the status
quo. From a theoretical aspect, I also refute the argument as welfare provision is generally rather low in low-
and middle-income democracies so that the status quo varies less in these countries, which are the focus of the
analysis.
16I chose this approach since interpretation of a hierarchical ordered probit model comes at the cost of high
complexity without increasing informational gain compared to the linear model.
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as ratio of GDP as proxy for fiscal capacity17. Tax revenue does not include social security
contributions, as contributions attribute to a mechanism of payment-and-reward. Although a
more fine-grained operationalization of fiscal capacity would be an asset, data constraints for
the developing world complicate the construction of a more complex and sensitive measurement
of taxation18.
The second variable of interest considers the distributive capacity of the state which I concep-
tualize as the quality of institutions. Measuring institutional performance is a delicate matter
as comparable cross-country data for both developed and developing democracies are limited.
I rely on the six indicators of the Worldwide Governance Indicators of the World Bank as it is
the most comprehensive dataset in this regard. Next to the rule of law indicator, it includes a
measure for “voice and accountability”, “political stability”, “government effectiveness”, “regu-
latory quality”, and “control of corruption” (see Kaufmann et al., 2010). All of these indicators
measure central parts of institutional quality, as Keefer and Knack (1997) emphasized as well.
However, since all indicators are highly correlated I apply a principal component analysis (PCA)
to reduce the indicators to a single scale which reflects the underlying latent structure which I
call the quality of institutions.
Size of the Informal Sector and Corruption
Next to measuring institutional performance from a “functional” perspective, I add two further
variables of interest which measure the opposite of a well-functioning state: the size of the
informal sector and the level of corruption. The impact of the size of the informal sector
is proxied by a value for the informal economy. The World Bank recently published a study on
“Shadow Economies all over the World” by Schneider et al. (2010) with data on the size of the
informal economy (relative to GDP) for 162 countries between 1999 and 2007 based on a Multi-
ple Indicators Multiple Causes (MIMIC) approach19. The measure takes values between 0 and
100, where 100 means that a country’s entire GDP is based on informal economy. Corruption is
17Using tax revenue as share of GDP of the Government Finance Statistics (2012) of the IMF (central govern-
ment) as robustness test to measure fiscal capacity also leads to a positive significant result for preferences on
redistribution. Both measures are highly correlated.
18Ivanyna and Von Haldenwang (2012) provide an overview of different measures for tax revenue and discuss
obstacles and limitations for data on taxation for developing countries.
19It is a special form of structural equation modeling which takes informal economy as a latent variable and
covariances of a number of observed variables to estimate the DV. Informal economy is a relative value, which is
measured as a percentage of GDP (Schneider et al. 2010).
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operationalized with the corruption perception index (CPI) of Transparency International (TI).
Values range from 1 (no corruption) to 10 (very severe corruption)20. All four independent vari-
ables are correlated, which increases multicollinearity and thus the hazard of misinterpretation
of the actual variable impact21 so that they are tested in separate models.
4.3 Controls
As controls on the micro level serve the variables age, age2 (in order to control for nonlinearity
effects of age), dummy variables for type of occupation (unemployed, self employed, part
time, retired, housewife, and student; the reference category is employed) and a dummy
variable for religiosity (religious). Education is measured on a scale from 1, reflecting no
education, to 5, indicating a university degree. I also employ a variable for party ideology
(left ideology) in order to take account of the vast welfare state literature which explains
the welfare state in terms of a class-based, power-resource theory (Huber and Stephens, 2001;
Korpi and Palme, 2003; Huber and Stephens, 2012). Individuals who support left-wing parties
are likely to favor increased governmental engagement with the public safety net. Finally, I add
attitudinal variables which have been depicted as influential factors for social policy preferences
in the literature22. I control for social trust to take into account the theoretical contribution
of Rothstein and Uslaner (2005) who are claiming that general social trust is positively linked
to the welfare state. Additionally, I add a variable for risk aversion23, because uncertainty
increases the individual’s preference for redistribution (see Rehm, 2009). I control for choice
as the variable encompasses the notion that an individual does not feel to have control over
success in life (WVS, item a173; no control=1), reflecting an individuals mobility expectations
(see Finseraas, 2009). If individuals expect to be rich in the future it decreases the individual’s
20The CPI is recoded.
21The correlation for the developing country sample for the main independent variables quality of institutions
and fiscal capacity is ρfiscal_insti = 0.54. quality of institutions and corruption correlate with ρcorr =
-0.87, and with informal the value is ρinf = -0.37. The relationship between fiscal capacity and corruption
is ρcorr = -0.50, and with informal the value is ρinf = -0.12.
22It is questionable if it is valid to use attitude variables to explain other attitudes. Acknowledging this concern,
I only use attitude variables as controls and not as explanatory variables. Considering the BIC value, the fit of
the model increases when adding the attitude variables, which supports their use from a technical perspective,
next to theoretical justifications explained above.
23The categorical variable ranges from 1 indicating that the most important aspect when looking for a job is
“[d]oing an important job that gives you a feeling of accomplishment ” to 4 which signals that it is “good income
so that you do not have any worries about money” (WVS, item c009). It is not an ideal measure for risk aversion,
but only an approximation of security needs of the individual. Higher values reflect the individuals preference
toward secure employment, and hence, a certain form of risk aversion.
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demand for higher redistribution (see Benabou and Ok, 2001).
Considering the well known median voter theorem (Meltzer and Richard, 1981) I also use
a measure for income inequality, employing the GINI coefficient provided by Solt (2009)24 on
the macro level. Findings from the OECD context show that higher income inequality fuel
redistributive preferences at the individual level (see Finseraas, 2009). The number of degrees
of freedom for the hierarchical model is very limited so that macro controls are restricted to a
minimum. Additional controls are included step by step (see Section 6) to test the sensitivity of
the findings. For the robustness test I add a variable for growth of GDP (World Bank WDI)25.
Welfare demand might be affected by the country’s economic development (see Alesina and
La Ferrara, 2005). Lastly, I apply a proxy for the actual strength of the welfare state, because
the existing scope of the welfare state affects people’s preferences on social policy (see Andreß
and Heien, 2001; Arts and Gelissen, 2001; Blekesaune and Quadagno, 2003; Linos and West,
2003; Jæger, 2006; Larsen, 2008; Jordan, 2013). As proxy serves social spending data from the
IMF (GFS) dataset. Table A (Appendix) shows descriptive statistics on the variables explained
above.
4.4 Case Selection
I select only those countries within the WVS that are classified as democracies. The central
difference in social policy preferences between authoritarian and democratic states is the eval-
uation of costs. When welfare is not based on tax revenue but derives from, for instance, oil
rents, a different logic for welfare demand applies by definition. Only when the welfare state
results from a democratic policy process, in which redistribution is part of fiscal policy, can we
expect preference formation to be a function of a cost-benefit calculation as performed here.
Understanding social policy preferences in authoritarian regimes would require a very differ-
ent theory. Using Polity IV as an identification instrument to determine regime type, I follow
the recommendations of Marshall et al. (2010), deeming only those countries democratic which
score +6 or higher. Both, developing and advanced industrial nations will be included in the
24The variable ranges from 0, indicating perfect income equality to 100, which would mean that all wealth
belongs to only one person in the country.
25GDP growth is used with a one-year lag with regard to survey year in order to take into account the fact
that last year’s GDP affects preferences more strongly than the current year’s. GDP growth instead of GDP per
capita is used as this variable is less correlated to social spending data.
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analysis using subsets26. However, as discussed above, I assume that the institutional context
only affects welfare demand in low- and middle-income countries27.
4.5 Descriptive Outlook
Descriptive statistics of the survey data that is used below support the intuition that context
matters differently in different economic contexts (see Figures 1 and 2). Average welfare de-
mand is lower in several high-income democracies despite high institutional performance. Fiscal
capacity and average welfare demand is positively correlated with a value of ρ1 = 0.31 (quality
of institutions: ρ2 = 0.15) for the low- and middle-income democracy sample. In contrast, the
correlation between average welfare demand and fiscal capacity is ρ3 = −0.04 and ρ4 = −0.67
for institutional performance in high-income democracies.28 Thus, we can expect that there is
a certain threshold effect of development at which point the quality of institutions and fiscal
capacity is taken for granted, going hand in hand with a generous welfare state29.
But can we expect that the quality of institutions and fiscal capacity also exert the same
effect across all developing regions? Due to different historical pathways to democracy and
consequently, diverging experience with democratic institutions and democratic political system,
it is also not unlikely that the independent variables do not have the expected impact across all
developing regions (cf. Linos and West, 2003). To explore this relationship I correlate average
welfare demand and the variables of interest for each region separately.
Quality of institutions andwelfare demand are positively correlated for Latin Amer-
ican and Caribbean countries (ρLAC= 0.69) and Asia (ρasia= 0.65). For the Eastern European
country sample the correlation is negative with ρafrica= -0.07 and also for the sample of African
states (ρeast= -0.25). The pattern slightly differs for redistributive preferences with ρLAC=
0.71 for Latin American and Caribbean countries, ρasia= 0.36 for Asia, ρafrica= 0.80 for the
26I categorize countries into the subsets “high-income country” and “low- and middle-income country” based on
the development classification of the World Bank (Nielsen, 2011). Low- and middle-income countries: Albania,
Bangladesh, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, Colombia, Czech Republic, Georgia, Ghana, Guatemala, India, Indone-
sia, Mali, Mexico, Moldova, Peru, Philippines, Trinidad and Tobago, Romania, South Africa, Turkey, Ukraine,
Uruguay, Venezuela. High-income countries: Australia, Canada, Cyprus, Finland, Germany, Italy, Japan, South
Korea, Norway, Poland, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United States.
27Testing the impact of institutional performance and fiscal capacity on the entire sample, I receive highly
significant positive coefficients for both variables on preferences for redistribution. Estimation results are available
on request.
28Values are similar for preferences on redistribution and the independent variables. Only for institutional
performance and redistributive preferences I receive ρ5 = 0.42 for the high-income country sample.
29Differences are also a consequence of the countries’ welfare regime (see Andreß and Heien, 2001; Arts and
Gelissen, 2001; Blekesaune and Quadagno, 2003; Linos and West, 2003; Jæger, 2006; Larsen, 2008; Jordan, 2013)
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Figure 1: The Quality of Institutions and Welfare Demand by Country
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Figure 2: The Quality of Institutions and Preferences for Redistribution by Country
ALB
BAN
BRA BUL
CHI
GEO
GHA
GUA
IND
INA
MDA
PHI
ROU
RSA
TTO
URU
SRB
AUS
CAN
CYP FINFRA
GER
ITA
JPN
KOR
NOR
POL
SLO
SWE
SUI
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Ag
g.
 C
ou
nt
ry
 M
ea
n 
of
 P
re
f. 
fo
r R
ed
ist
rib
ut
io
n
-4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5
Quality of Institutions
16
sample of African states, and ρeast= 0.18 for Eastern Europe. Context variables seem to be
most influential for social policy preferences in Latin American and Asian democracies, alluding
to the relevance of regional studies. As Larsen (2008) emphasizes, individual believes of deserv-
ingness regarding support and the tolerance of income inequality vary by country, which can be
explained, to some extent, by the type of welfare policies. The following analysis considers only
the level of welfare expenditures but not the type due to limited, comparable information on
the type of social policies in less developed democracies. Also cultural explanations beg further
exploration.
4.6 Model: Hierarchical Random-Intercept Model
The dependent variable is treated as a continuous variable, using a linear model. I apply a
random-intercept model, allowing the intercept to vary between countries. The estimation
model is defined as follows, where i denotes the individual level and j countries in which in-
dividuals are nested30. The variable yij describes the outcome variable welfare demand, or
redistribution respectively, for i = 1, ... n, and j = 1, .... N, as defined in the previous
section.
yij = αj + β1Xi + i (1)
αj = γ0 + γ1Zj + γ3Uj + ηj
ηj ∼ N(0, ση)
X is a vector of individual-level predictors, including micro variables as introduced above.
The second equation presents the regression on the intercept αj . U is a vector of state-level pre-
dictors. Z reflects the independent variables fiscal capacity and quality of institutions
which are added one at a time due to multicollinearity issues. Because of the low number of
degrees of freedom and the parameter intensive hierarchical model I use stepwise inclusion of
further macro level variables in the robustness test. Survey weights are included at the micro
30Equations 1 and 2 are formulated according to the notation used in Gelman and Hill (2007).
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level. All indicators are standardized by subtracting the mean and dividing the value by its
standard deviation (Gelman and Hill, 2007), in order to compare coefficients in the magnitude
of their effects.
I estimate the Null model in order to find out how much of the variance is explained by
country level. To estimate the intra-class correlation (ICC) % I look at the ratio between group-
level and individual-level variances, calculated by σ2α/(σ2α + σ2y) (Gelman and Hill, 2007). I
receive a value of % = 0.06 for the model with welfare demand as DV and % = 0.10 for
redistribution, so that 6%, and respectively 10%, of the variance is explained by level 2,
which is a fair amount, keeping in mind that preferences are largely driven by micro-level
factors.
In a second step, I perform a logistic multilevel regression analysis in order to meet the
needs of the data structure as discussed in section 4.1. The dependent variable is labeled as
the probability of yij=1 for welfare demand and 0 signaling accordance with the statement that
every individual should provided for herself (for i = 1, ..., n and j = 1, ..., N) and yij=1 for
favoring redistribution respectively.
Pr(yij = 1) = logit−1(αj + βXi) (2)
αj ∼ N(γ0 + γ1Zj , σ2j )
Again, X is a vector of micro-level predictors including the same set of variables as in the
linear model above. Results from the logistical model are discussed in the robustness section 6.
5 Result
Fiscal capacity and the Quality of Institutions
Estimation results of the main model of interest containing only low- and middle-income democ-
racies, are shown in Table 1. I find support for the first hypotheses H1 on the impact of fiscal
capacity on welfare demand and preferences for redistribution (Model 1 and 3). A more func-
tional state in terms of better fiscal capacity increases individual demand for welfare provided
by the state. A unit increase of fiscal capacity augments welfare demand by 0.6 stan-
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dard deviations at the 10 percent level of significance and redistributive preferences by 1.04
standard deviations at the five percent level of significance. Compelling capacities of the state
to extract revenue raises welfare demand. As predicted, fiscal capacity positively influences so-
cial policy preferences only in low and middle-income countries (see Table 2). The distributive
capacities, mirrored by the quality of institutions mainly influence redistributive prefer-
ences, a one unit increase raises preferences for redistribution by 0.78 standard deviations in
the developing country sample, supporting H2.
Table 1: Linear Hierarchical Varying-Intercept Regression: Developing
Countries
DV Welfare Demand Welfare Demand Redistribution Redistribution
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Micro Predictors
income
low income 0.324*** 0.294*** 0.295*** 0.282***
(ref: high income) (0.091) (0.077) (0.086) (0.077)
middle income 0.201*** 0.163*** 0.203*** 0.178***
(0.068) (0.061) (0.061) (0.049)
female 0.013 0.038 0.057 0.052
(0.034) (0.031) (0.046) (0.041)
age 0.473** 0.370* 0.125 0.119
(0.202) (0.201) (0.142) (0.125)
age2 -0.515** -0.419** -0.101 -0.125
(0.202) (0.191) (0.137) (0.128)
married -0.062* -0.045 -0.036 -0.042
(0.038) (0.034) (0.037) (0.032)
religious -0.029 -0.037 -0.129*** -0.121***
(0.037) (0.035) (0.050) (0.041)
employment status
unemployed 0.069* 0.076** 0.065 0.054
(ref: employed) (0.040) (0.035) (0.051) (0.047)
retired 0.145*** 0.150*** 0.111*** 0.108***
(0.054) (0.045) (0.033) (0.032)
self employed 0.023 0.026 0.035 0.022
(0.035) (0.030) (0.033) (0.030)
part time employed 0.022 0.020 0.014 0.010
(0.031) (0.028) (0.043) (0.038)
housewife 0.086** 0.083** 0.067** 0.067**
(0.043) (0.035) (0.030) (0.031)
student -0.020 -0.024 0.027 0.027
(0.063) (0.057) (0.031) (0.028)
left ideology 0.229*** 0.201*** 0.218*** 0.200***
(0.058) (0.051) (0.064) (0.055)
education -0.142*** -0.127*** -0.197*** -0.232***
(0.029) (0.028) (0.046) (0.043)
choice 0.135*** 0.127*** 0.181*** 0.181***
(0.051) (0.045) (0.043) (0.040)
social trust 0.016 0.002 0.189*** 0.163***
(0.051) (0.047) (0.048) (0.043)
risk aversion 0.189*** 0.178*** 0.113*** 0.112***
(0.073) (0.061) (0.031) (0.025)
Macro Predictors
fiscal capacity 0.600* 1.038**
(0.345) (0.460)
quality of institutions -0.147 0.783**
(0.324) (0.334)
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GINI 0.137 0.117 -0.103 -0.092
(0.293) (0.295) (0.279) (0.278)
waveIV 0.607 0.238 0.715** 0.355**
(0.372) (0.186) (0.298) (0.165)
constant 6.049*** 6.017*** 4.736*** 5.151***
(0.178) (0.229) (0.241) (0.290)
Random Effects Parameters
Var (constant) 0.567 0.754 1.342 0.735
(0.182) (0.273) (0.453) (0.142)
Var (residual) 11.369 11.525 9.096 9.257
(0.493) (0.480) (0.520) (0.492)
N Level 1 19792 23529 19646 23347
N Level 2 23 27 23 27
BIC 96273.3 116314.7 91558.0 110644.3
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; Survey weights included; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, ***
p < 0.01. Source: WVS: Wave IV, V; World Bank WGI (2012); World Bank WDI (2012); Solt
2009.
Redistributive preferences might be more sensitive to the institutional context than mere
welfare demand, as redistribution attributes to the creation of winners and losers and a certain
notion of distributive justice. The quality of institutions is more relevant to fulfill such a task
than for the “simple” provision of benefits, as reflected in welfare demand. This latter finding
also holds for the high-income country sample displayed in Table 2 Model 9, contradicting the
regional relevance of institutional performance expressed in hypothesis 2 to some extent, but
revealing first empirical evidence for the micro mechanism behind Rothstein et al. (2011)’s ar-
gument. The justice aspect seems to be independent of the level of welfare provision and the
overall economic development so that institutional strength also matters in the advanced indus-
trial nations. The second hypothesis therefore needs to be revised; institutional performance
raises redistributive preferences in both developing and developed democracies.
The coefficient for income inequality is however not significant. That income inequality fails
to increase welfare output in developing countries, particularly in Latin American countries,
despite the median voter theorem, is not a new finding (Segura-Ubiergo and Kaufman, 2001).
But that income inequality also fails to enter people’s preference formation in the context of
severe inequality is rather surprising31. Different specifications of the measurement of income
inequality might be needed as performed in Dion and Birchfield (2010) and Lupu and Pontusson
(2011).
31This result partly supports Cramer and Kaufman’s (2011) ambiguous observations that the poor’s dissatis-
faction with income distribution in Latin America does not increase as income inequality grows, even though the
authors do find an impact of inequality for the middle class.
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Table 2: High Income Country Sample
Welfare Demand Welfare Demand Redistribution Redistribution
(5) (6) (7) (8)
fiscal capacity -0.397 0.427
(0.494) (0.352)
quality of institutions -0.511 0.821***
(0.524) (0.176)
GINI 1.827 2.123*** 0.823 -0.336
(1.133) (0.594) (0.834) (0.362)
constant 7.477*** 8.272*** 6.150*** 4.245***
(0.967) (0.927) (0.718) (0.347)
Random Effects Parameters
Var (constant) 1.350 1.281 0.870 0.441
(0.707) (0.430) (0.554) (0.192)
Var (residual) 7.245 7.267 6.365 6.327
(0.331) (0.326) (0.271) (0.273)
N Level 1 13767 14240 13685 14139
N Level 2 18 18 18 18
BIC 63441.4 65805.0 61430.4 63468.1
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; Survey weights included;* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Models
include all variables as in Table 1. For presentation purposes only variables of interest are displayed. Source:
WVS: Wave IV, V; WB WGI; WB WDI; Solt 2009.
At the micro level I find several effects that are consistent with preference theory on re-
distribution and social policy. In line with findings from the OECD world, income is a strong
driver for welfare preferences (M 1-4). As low-income individuals are at higher risk of falling
into the social safety net, this outcome is very intuitive. The results for the negative impact
of education are also consistent with findings in the literature (cf. Finseraas, 2009), as higher
education entails higher earning power (Häusermann and Schwander, 2010). The unemployed
are more likely to favor state-led welfare provision, again a very intuitive result given their need
for insurance, just as the retired and housewives are more likely to demand more governmen-
tal engagement in welfare and redistribution. A left-wing ideology is also a strong driver for
welfare preferences and redistribution. A left-wing ideology fosters welfare demand, supporting
the potential relevance of power-resource approaches (Huber and Stephens, 2001) in explain-
ing welfare policy in developing countries. Regarding the attitudinal variables, risk aversion,
trust and the lack of control of one’s own life (choice), they increase welfare demand and
redistributive preferences, in line with findings from the OECD context (on risk aversion and
mobility expectations, cf. Benabou and Ok, 2001; Piketty, 1995). Trust increases preferences
for redistribution also in low- and middle-income democracies just as Rothstein and Uslaner
(2005) predict for the high-income country context.
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Corruption and Informality
When all other predictors are at their mean value, the size of the informal sector has a negative
effect on welfare demand at the 5 percent level of significance. A one percentage increase in the
size of the informal economy decreases redistributive preferences by 0.6 standard deviations (M
11, Table 3). The average individual seems to be sensitive to the detrimental forces following
from a large group of free-riders in regard to the consequences for the public goods game. But
informality does not significantly influence welfare demand, which might be explained by the
fact that a larger informal sector also means that there is a larger share of individuals who favor
increased welfare provision as it does not come at a cost for them. Further research on this
mechanism with more sensitive data is needed.
Table 3: Detrimental Effects: Corruption and Informality
Welfare Demand Welfare Demand Redistribution Redistribution
(9) (10) (11) (12)
informal 0.036 -0.603**
(0.270) (0.284)
corruption -0.511** -0.791
(0.243) (0.515)
GINI 0.091 -0.078 0.127 -0.182
(0.282) (0.206) (0.257) (0.292)
constant 6.079*** 6.449*** 5.004*** 5.193***
(0.147) (0.199) (0.228) (0.392)
Random Effects Parameters
Var (constant) 0.729 0.632 0.801 0.761
(0.209) (0.183) (0.225) (0.126)
Var (residual) 11.595 11.525 9.293 9.255
(0.484) (0.480) (0.501) (0.493)
N Level 1 23010 23529 22831 23347
N Level 2 26 27 26 27
BIC 113696.4 116310.0 108113.9 110640.5
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; Survey weights included; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Source:
WVS: Wave IV, V; Solt 2009; Scheider et al. 2010; CPI Transparency International; Note: Models include all
variables as in Table 1. For presentation purposes only variables of interest are displayed.
Corruption decreases welfare demand as expected. However, it is surprising that we do not
find a negative impact on redistributive preferences. Among the detrimental factors, identified
as corruption and the informal sector, both factors exert a negative effect on social policy
preferences, supporting the theoretical expectations. The models which include a variable for
corruption have a marginally better model fit. The fit of the models can be compared by looking
at the size of the BIC values. Lower values signal a better model fit. Models including fiscal
capacity have the smallest BIC values, signaling most explanatory capacity (Table 1).
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6 Robustness Tests
6.1 Stepwise Inclusion
Because of the low number of observations at level two, the number of additional parameters
is limited. Testing the reliability of the findings I add a further control for growth of GDP
(Word Bank, WDI) and social spending from the IMF GFS (social protection). Because of
limited data on social security expenditures for several countries, the number of observations is
reduced, which is particularly problematic for the degrees of freedom at level two. Results are
displayed in Table 4.
Table 4: Linear Hierarchical Varying-Intercept Regression: Developing Countries
Welfare Demand Welfare Demand Redistribution Redistribution
(13) (14) (15) (16)
fiscal capacity 0.571* 0.0327
(0.341) (0.561)
quality of 0.637* 1.077***
institutions (0.363) (0.323)
social protection 0.951 3.115 -1.460 0.226
(2.305) (2.051) (2.007) (1.531)
GDP growth 0.173 0.146 -0.256*** -0.284***
(0.114) (0.166) (0.089) (0.085)
waveIV 0.505 0.211 -0.855 -0.484*
(0.338) (0.192) (0.531) (0.265)
GINI 0.490 -0.0120 0.672 -0.0544
(0.328) (0.477) (0.526) (0.494)
constant 6.372*** 7.058*** 5.153*** 5.912***
(0.456) (0.412) (0.441) (0.233)
Random Effects Parameters
Var (constant) 0.466 0.596 0.960 0.574
(0.151) (0.175) (0.271) (0.163)
Var (residual) 10.441 10.954 8.089 8.535
(0.729) (0.739) (0.623) (0.620)
N Level 1 8503 9840 8421 9732
N Level 2 14 16 14 16
BIC 43978.3 51425.0 41430.5 48447.6
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; Survey weights included; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Models
include all variables as in Table 1. For presentation purposes only variables of interest are displayed. Source:
WVS: Wave IV, V; IMF GFS, WB WGI; WB WDI; Solt 2009.
The findings on the impact following from fiscal capacity and institutional performance re-
main robust in Models 13 and 16, Table 4. The coefficient for quality of institutions on
welfare demand becomes significant, while the effect following from fiscal capacity on
redistributive preferences is not significant anymore. Differences in the number of observa-
tions might explain the deviance. The BIC heavily drops in Models 13 - 16 but this is also a
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consequence of the harsh reduction of observations. BIC values for models with different sizes
of N need be compared with caution as the value is sensitive to the number of observations.
The most robust findings are consequently the positive impact following from fiscal capacity
on welfare demand and the positive effect resulting from the quality of institutions on
redistributive preferences.
6.2 Logistic Hierarchical Model
Finally, I employ a sensitivity test which aims at the structure of the dependent variables
welfare demand and redistribution. I check if respondents cluster at extreme points by
using a logistic hierarchical model. A large number of respondents does so on the values 5 and
6, which suggests a measurement effect due to the design of the items. In order to express
indifference between the two attitudes (1-10), respondents choose either 5 or 6. Dichotomizing
the items is biased by those respondents who arbitrarily answered 5 and 6 to express indifference.
Following the statistical strategy of Gelman and Park (2009), I therefore exclude categories 5
and 6 from the variable and dichotomize categories32 1-4 as 0 and 7-10 as 1. The estimation
model was introduced in section 4.6. I report results as logistic coefficients (Table 5).
Table 5: Logistic Hierarchical Random-Intercept Regression: Developing Countries
Welfare Demand Welfare Demand Redistribution Redistribution
(17) (18) (19) (20)
fiscal capacity 0.351*** 0.599***
(0.126) (0.201)
quality of institutions 0.008 0.512**
(0.181) (0.212)
constant 0.301*** 0.334** -0.744*** -0.457**
(0.102) (0.152) (0.173) (0.186)
Random Effects Parameters
Var (constant) 0.220 0.270 0.658 0.455
(0.074) (0.085) (0.210) (0.127)
N Level 1 19792 23529 16676 19769
N Level 2 23 27 23 27
BIC 25915.6 30756.6 19895.8 23685.9
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; Survey weights included; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Models
include all variables as in Table 1. For presentation purposes only variables of interest are displayed. Source:
WVS: Wave IV, V; WB WGI; WB WDI; Solt 2009.
The results in Table 5 support the findings from the linear model. A unit increase in
fiscal capacity increases the probability of greater demand for public welfare by 0.35 standard
32Dichotomizing the DVs on the full 1-10 scale without excluding the answer categories 5 and 6 does not change
the outcome to any relevant extent.
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deviations and for preferences for redistribution by 0.6 standard deviations at the one percent
level of significance. Quality of institutions is also positive and significant at the five
percent level of significance, but again only for redistributive preferences (M 20). Findings on
the impact of fiscal capacity and quality of institutions remain robust in the logistic
hierarchical model.
7 Conclusion
Triggered by Mares (2005) work on the influence of state capacity on social insurance preferences,
and Rothstein et al. (2011) contribution about the quality of the government and the welfare
state, the research question addressed in this article asked how individuals think about public
welfare when the stable background of high-income economies dissolves. I have shown that
welfare preferences in low- and middle-income democracies are influenced by the level of fiscal
capacity and institutional performance. In line with recent research of Huber and Stephens
(2012), the analysis reveals that democratic ideals work positively on welfare demand. However,
instead of looking at the impact of the indistinct notion of democracy, I have studied concrete
expressions of democracy that is the distributive capacity of the state – needed to reliably
distribute welfare services – and the capacity of the state to extract revenue. A state which is
built on a stable legal framework, forcing citizens and elites to adhere to democratic standards,
and which is at the same time capable of levying tax in order to sustain public budgets, increases
welfare demand and redistributive preferences at the individual level. While fiscal capacity does
not enter welfare demand in affluent democracies, it is a decisive issue in low- and middle-income
democracies, where a weak state calls reliability of welfare provision into question. The quality
of institutions has a positive influence on redistributive preferences in both developed and
developing democracies.
The study confirms several arguments from classical political economy approaches, such as
the micro-level effects of income, education, age, ideology, employment status, risk aversion and
trust. The study however advocates for a more fine-grained analysis of regional characteristics
and, hence, further research with a regional focus. Based on empirical investigations fiscal
capacity and institutional quality seem to explain social policy preferences in some regions to
a lesser degree than in others. From the perspective of a broader research agenda, a better
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understanding of the formation of welfare preferences that takes into account characteristics
of the developing world such as institutional strength, capacities of the state to raise revenue,
corruption and the size of the informal sector is essential to explain not only the input side of
the welfare state but also – in the long run – welfare output in the Global South.
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8 Appendix
Table A: Descriptive Statistics of Individual and Country Level Data
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Dependent Variables
welfare demand 44720 6.095 3.366 1 10
redistribution 43764 5.199 3.115 1 10
Independent Variables
fiscal capacity 37405 17.921 7.222 7.700 47.710
quality of institutions 43911 0 2.342 -3.666 4.310
Micro Variables
female 44720 0.490 0.500 0 1
age 44720 41.741 16.129 15 99
age2 44720 2002.392 1502.106 225 9801
married 44720 0.647 0.478 0 1
religious 44720 0.708 0.455 0 1
low income 44720 0.357 0.479 0 1
middle income 44720 0.506 0.500 0 1
unemployed 44720 0.102 0.303 0 1
retired 44720 0.133 0.340 0 1
self employed 44720 0.117 0.321 0 1
part time employed 44720 0.083 0.276 0 1
housewife 44720 0.136 0.343 0 1
student 44720 0.073 0.260 0 1
education 44720 3.069 1.136 1 5
left ideology 44720 0.173 0.378 0 1
choice 44720 3.823 2.362 1 10
trust 43708 0.257 0.437 0 1
risk aversion 39454 2.758 1.122 1 4
Macro Variables
informal 44143 28.421 12.502 8.1 62.1
corruption 44720 4.913 2.250 0.400 8.8
GINI 44720 39.905 11.116 23.328 67.756
social protection 24212 277753 1496130 10.639 10700000
gdp growth 43430 4.592 2.575 -5.970 12.344
wave IV 44720 0.379 0.485 0 1
Source: WVS (IV-V); World Bank World Development Indicator, Worldwide Governance Indica-
tors; Schneider et al. (2010), Solt (2009); IMF GFS (social protection).
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